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Abstract 
Security questions are one of the techniques used to recover passwords. The main limitation of security 
questions is that users find strong answers difficult to remember. This leads users to trade-off security 
for the convenience of an improved memorability. Previous research found that increased fun and 
enjoyment can lead to an enhanced memorability, which provides a better learning experience. Hence, 
we empirically investigate whether a serious game has the potential of improving the memorability of 
strong answers to security questions. For our serious game, we adapted the popular “4 Pics 1 word” 
mobile game because of its use of pictures and cues, which psychology research found to be important 
to help with memorability. Our findings indicate that the proposed serious game could potentially 
improve the memorability of answers to security questions. This potential improvement in 
memorability, could eventually help reduce the trade-off between usability and security in fall-back 
authentication. 
Keywords Usable Security, Fall-back Authentication, Security Questions, Serious Games, 
Memorability 
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1 Introduction 
As internet users have to deal with an increasing number of online accounts, they are facing an  
enormous challenge to remember all passwords chosen for their accounts (Stavova et al. 2016). For 
example, if we just look at social networking sites, plenty of users have different accounts for Facebook, 
Twitter, Instagram and SnapChat. Since password managers have not been widely adopted (Alkaldi and 
Renauld 2016), resetting passwords is becoming a more frequent task (Florencio and Herley 2007; 
Stavova et al. 2016). To address this problem, various forms of fall-back authentication mechanisms 
have been deployed and evaluated with the most popular being security questions (Schechter and 
Reeder 2009) and email-based password recovery. Although email-based password recovery has been 
widely adopted by major companies (e.g. Google), they still have the limitation of being vulnerable to 
‘man in the middle’ attacks, since these emails are not usually encrypted (Stavova et al. 2016).  
Even security questions have several vulnerabilities. For instance, some answers to security questions 
can be easily accessible with a quick Google search (e.g. in Sarah Palin's 2008 email hack (Bridis 2008), 
the hacker merely used social engineering techniques to reset Palin's password using her birth-date, ZIP 
code and where she met her spouse). Also, since 2008, more of our personal information has become 
available online. Hence, it is becoming easier for attackers to retrieve this information (Golla and 
Dürmuth 2015), through observational attacks (i.e. the art of human hacking used to obtain sensitive 
information such as usernames, passwords, personal identification numbers through observing how 
victims behave both online and off-line), from social networking websites, such as LinkedIn or Facebook 
(Rabkin 2008). Besides observational attacks, security questions are also vulnerable to guessing attacks 
(Golla and Dürmuth 2015), in which, attackers try to access accounts by providing low entropy (i.e. the 
level of complexity) answers (e.g. favourite colour: blue). Thus, the ease of conducting observational and 
guessing attacks has increased the vulnerabilities of security questions (Just and Aspinall 2010) towards 
all these cyber-threats, which lead to severe consequences, such as monetary loss and embarrassment 
(Micallef and Just 2011).  
A possible way to reduce the vulnerability of security questions towards cyber-attacks is to use system-
generated answers (Micallef and Just 2011).  However, the main barrier towards widespread adoption 
of these techniques is memorability (Just and Aspinall 2009), since users struggle to remember system-
generated information to answer their security questions (Bonneau et al. 2015).  Hence, the main 
challenge of the current implementation of security questions is that strong answers to security 
questions (i.e. high entropy), like those provided by system-generated answers (Micallef and Just 2011), 
are less prone to observational and guessing attacks, but at the same time are difficult for the user to 
remember the answers (Shay et al. 2012). Alternatively, weak answers to security questions (i.e. low 
entropy) are more prone to cyber-attacks (Bonneau et al. 2010; Denning et al. 2011), nevertheless they 
are easy for the user to remember the answers (Zviran and Haga 1990). 
Since system-generated answers to security questions can limit the vulnerabilities to guessing and social 
engineering attacks (Shay et al. 2012), they seem to be the most promising solution to bridge the trade-
off between usability and security in fall-back authentication (Micallef and Arachchilage 2017a, 2017b). 
However, system-generated answers to security questions need to be better presented to the user, by 
investigating techniques that could enhance memorability (Micallef and Arachchilage 2017a, 2017b). 
Previous work (Ho et al. 2009) found that an increase in fun and enjoyment leads to an enhanced 
memorability and consequently an improved learning experience. One could argue that an improved 
learning experience provides a high user satisfaction, which was empirically investigated by previous 
work on security behaviour (Arachchilage et al. 2016), that it could motivate users to change peoples’ 
phishing threat avoidance behaviour.  Hence, in this paper, we evaluate a serious game that nudges 
users’ memorability of answers to security questions with the ultimate goal of bridging the trade-off 
between usability (i.e. memorability) and security during fall-back authentication.  
We decided to implement a serious game as a mobile app and to primarily focus on the 18-35 age group 
because 95% of Australians in this age group own a mobile phone (Poushter 2016), due to its mobility 
nature. Hence, in our research, we adapted the popular picture-based "4 Pics 1 Word" mobile game 
(Google Play 2014). This game asks users to pick the word that relates the given pictures (e.g. for pictures 
in Figure 1a the relating word would be "Walk"). We selected this game because of its use of pictures and 
cues, in which, previous psychology research has found to be important to help with memorability 
(Paivio et al. 1968). Besides asking users to solve the standard game’s challenges, we adapted this game, 
so that it also asks users to solve challenges based on the answers chosen to their security questions 
(security questions challenges) (Micallef and Arachchilage 2017a, 2017b).  
Since the aim of this work is to understand whether or not the proposed serious game has the potential 
of improving the memorability of stronger answers to security questions (in this case system-generated 
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answers), in our evaluation we assigned participants to one of two groups. Group 1 selects their own 
answers to security questions (i.e. control group). Group 2 uses answers based on a system-generated 
profile (i.e. experimental group) (similar to Micallef and Just (2011)). We also want to understand the 
short-term impact (in terms of workload and memorability) of using system-generated profiles, when 
memorizing answers to security questions, playing a game and then remembering answers to security 
questions. Hence, our research contributes to the field of fall-back authentication by answering the 
following research questions (RQs):   
RQ1: Does the serious game have the potential of helping users remember stronger answers to security 
questions? 
RQ2: What’s the short-term impact of using a system-generated profile on memorizing answers to 
security questions, playing a game and then remembering answers to security questions? 
We know to our cost that no-one has evaluated the design of a serious game to nudge users’ memorability 
towards stronger answers to security questions based on system-generated profiles. In Section 2, we 
describe the background related to our research. In Section 3, we describe the game, security questions 
and system-generated profiles that we use in our user evaluation.  Afterwards, we describe our user 
evaluation (Section 4), present the results of the evaluation (Section 5) and discuss how these results 
answer RQ1 and RQ2 (Section 6). Finally, we present the limitations of this research, future work 
(Section 7) and main conclusions that could be drawn from this work (Section 8). 
2 Related Work 
2.1 Security Questions and System-generated Data 
Security questions are set-up at account creation. Then, at password recovery, users have to remember 
the answers that they provided when setting up the account. Recent studies, conducted using security 
questions data collected by Google (Bonneau et al. 2015), found that security questions are neither 
usable (i.e. low memorability) nor secure enough to recovery passwords. This means that new 
techniques need to be investigated to provide more secure and memorable security questions.   
System-generated password schemes were evaluated to be more secure than user-defined passwords 
(Shay et al. 2012). However, they were evaluated to be not memorable (Al-Ameen et al. 2015), even when 
using natural-language words (Wright et al. 2012). For instance, Wright et al. (2012) evaluated the 
usability of three system-generated password schemes and found that these schemes did not have 
sufficient memorability rates. Also, Forget et al. (2008) evaluated a hybrid scheme which uses both user-
selected and system-generated passwords by having a system which randomly adds characters to a user-
chosen password to improve its' security. This scheme only achieved a memorability of 25% when two 
random characters were inserted. These findings further justify the need to evaluate new techniques (see 
Section 2.2) to improve users' memorability of system-generated data. 
2.2 Memorability and Gamification 
Bonneau and Schechter (2014) found that most users can memorize passwords when using tools that 
support learning over time. Atkinson and Shiffrin (1968) proposed a cognitive memory model, in which, 
new information is transferred to short-term memory through sensory organs. The short-term memory 
holds this new information as mental representations of selected parts of the information. This 
information is only passed from short-term to long-term memory when it can be encoded through cue-
association (Atkinson and Shiffrin 1968) (e.g. when we see a cat it reminds us of our first cat). This 
encoding helps people remember and retrieve the stored information over a long period of time. These 
encodings are strengthened through constant rehearsals. Psychology research (Paivio et al. 1968; 
Thornton 2001) found that humans are better at remembering images than text (i.e. the picture 
superiority effect). The picture superiority effect has also been extensively used in usable security to 
research graphical authentication mechanisms (De Angeli et al. 2005; Denning et al. 2011; Stobert and 
Biddle 2013; Castellucia et al. 2017). Hence, in our research we use these psychology findings to design 
a game that nudges users’ memorability of stronger answers to security questions. 
Besides the previously described work, in our research we use a game-based learning approach because 
previous work in the security field (Arachchilage and Love 2013) has successfully used this approach to 
educate users about the susceptibility to phishing attacks, to teach users to be less prone to these types 
of security vulnerabilities (Arachchilage et al. 2012, 2014, 2016). Thus, our main contribution to the field 
of fall-back authentication is to investigate whether or not the proposed serious game has the potential 
of improving users’ memorability of stronger answers to security questions. 
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3 Serious Game 
This section describes the game design, security questions and system-generated profiles used in our 
user evaluation. 
3.1 Game Design 
Using the popular "4 Pics 1 Word" mobile game, we create encoding associations between cues and 
answers to security questions through the picture-based nature of this game and by adding verbal cues. 
The game functions similarly to the "4 Pics 1 Word" mobile game, meaning that the game asks players 
to pick the word that relates the given pictures (e.g. for the pictures in Figure 1a the relating word would 
be “Walk"). However, at certain intervals, the game asks players to solve challenges based on answers to 
their security questions. These challenges could either be based on users’ own answers to security 
questions or on answers based on system-generated profiles. The game provides players with 12 letters 
to assist them with solving the challenge (as in the original “4 Pics 1 Word” mobile game). For each given 
answer, players are either rewarded or deducted points (10 for standard challenges, 15 for recognition 
security questions challenges and 20 for recall security questions challenges – these numbers were 
selected to motivate players to solve security question challenges). Points can be used to obtain hints to 
help solving more difficult challenges (deduction of 50 points for each hint, as in the original game). 
 
Figure 1: Challenges:  a) standard, b) recall, c) recognition. 
The Generate-recognize theory (Anderson and Bower 1972) states that recognition (i.e. remembering 
contextual information when a focus is provided (Hollingworth 1913)) is easier and faster to perform 
than recall (i.e. remembering a specific focus when context is provided (Hollingworth 1913)). Thus, for 
security questions challenges, in the proposed game we use both recall and recognition challenges (see 
Figure 1b and 1c) because having only recognition challenges would have lowered the security level of 
the game, since the answer space would have been very limited. Therefore, the players are provided with 
more recognition challenges (i.e. select 1 of 4 pictures) at the beginning, with the purpose of encoding 
into long-term memory the associations between cues (pictures) and information (answers to security 
questions). Then, as the player gets used to the game and learns the answers the game starts showing 
more recall (i.e. provide exact answer to security questions) rather than recognition challenges. 
Psychology research (Anderson and Bower 1972) has shown that it is difficult to remember information 
spontaneously without having any kind of memory cues. Hence, besides showing the 12 letters we added 
a feature that shows verbal cues about each picture. This feature can be enabled by using the points (i.e. 
when the game player earns 50 points throughout the game) that are gathered when solving other game 
challenges. This feature was added so that players could focus their attention on associating the words 
with the corresponding cues (pictures). We hypothesize that this feature should also help to process and 
encode the information in memory, to store it in long-term memory (Al-Ameen at al. 2015). To reduce 
the vulnerabilities towards potential guessing attacks, our serious game has the following features:  (1) 
does not show the length of the word that needs to be guessed; (2) does not show the correct answer 
when the wrong answer is provided; and (3) does not provide any hints for recognition challenges since 
the answer space is already very limited. These features make the game more difficult, but we argue that 
they minimize the security vulnerabilities of the game.  
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3.2 Security Questions 
We used previous research (Rabkin 2008; Bonneau et al. 2010; Micallef and Just 2011; Bonneau et al. 
2015) to define the security questions categories listed in Table 1. Names, favourites and places were 
selected because they are the most popular types of security questions found on websites (Rabkin 2008; 
Bonneau et al. 2010). Numbers were selected because they could potentially be the most secure security 
questions (Bonneau et al. 2015). Characteristics were added to make the system-generated data look 
similar to a profile (Micallef and Just 2011).  To cover a wide range of questions we arbitrary selected 3 
questions for each category (see Table 1). During the evaluation we asked participants to select 3 security 
questions because Renaud and Just (2010) found that posing 3 or more questions serially would be more 
secure, since it is difficult to guess all 3 answers irrespective of how close the attacker is to the victim. In 
our studies we do not use freely chosen security questions (e.g. the user defines his own answers to 
security questions) with free-form answers because Just and Aspinall (2010) reported serious concerns 
over the usability of these security questions (e.g. difficult to precisely remember the given answers). 
 
Type Security Questions 
Names Mother's maiden name, Father's middle name, Best friends name. 
Favourites Favourite pet, Favourite food, Favourite hobby. 
Numbers Last 6 digits Visa no, Last 6 digits Phone number, Vehicle registration number. 
Places High school city name, College city name, First work city name. 
Characteristics First occupation, Last gained skill, Main Weakness. 
Table 1.  Security questions. 
3.3 System-generated Profiles 
Figure 2 shows the system-generated profiles that we used in our user evaluation. We defined these 
system-generated profiles using Fake Name Generator (Corban Works 2006). We selected the attributes 
of these profiles by combining the attributes that were used by Micallef and Just (2011) to the list of 
security questions that we defined in Table 1. We defined a male and a female profile so that we cover 
the two most common genders. Since the design of a system-generated profile is not the main focus of 
this research, further research needs to be conducted to identify the optimal attributes that are required 
for a system-generated profile to be used to answer security questions. 
 
Figure 2: System-generated profiles 
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4 User Evaluation 
To answer our research questions (RQ1 and RQ2), we conducted a lab evaluation which consisted of 
two sessions (Session 1 – participants selected security questions and answers, Session 2 – participants 
memorized answers to security questions, played game and remembered answers to security questions). 
We used a between subjects design to compare and contrast our two groups of participants. Participants 
were randomly split into 2 equal groups. Group 1 participants were provided with a list of security 
questions. Then, they were asked to come up with the answers to those security questions by themselves. 
Group 2 participants were given 2 system-generated profiles (see Figure 2) and they were asked to 
choose one profile. Then, they were asked to choose security questions/answers from the chosen profile. 
Prior to starting the evaluation we obtained ethical approval from our University’s Ethics Committee.  
4.1 Procedure 
Before starting the evaluation we conducted a small pilot study with 4 participants to evaluate the setup. 
Since the pilot study did not highlight any problems (we just removed 4 questions from pre-evaluation 
questionnaire) we included the 4 pilot participants in the main user evaluation. Session 1 was conducted 
separately because we needed time to configure the serious game based on the answers that were 
selected by the participants.  In Session 1, participants were briefed on the evaluation, were asked to sign 
the consent form and selected security questions and answers. Participants also completed a pre-
evaluation questionnaire, consisting of demographic information together with details about 
participants’ experience with security questions and mobile phones. After configuring the game, this 
always happened on the same day as Session 1, we met with participants to conduct Session 2.  
In Session 2, participants were asked to conduct the following three tasks: Task 1 - memorize answers 
to security questions; Task 2 - play a game; and Task 3 - remember answers to security questions. All 
participants memorized the answers to the security questions within 5 minutes.  To understand the 
impact of using system-generated profiles on memorizing answers, playing the game and remembering 
answers (RQ2), participants completed the standard NASA task load index (NASA/TLX) questionnaire 
(Hart & Staveland 1988) after conducting every task (Tasks 1-3). We used the NASA/TLX metrics to 
evaluate workload because it is the standard metrics that is used in mobile HCI (Brewster 2002; Micallef 
et al. 2016) and usable security (Juang et al. 2012; Sherman et al. 2014) to evaluate mental demand, 
temporal demand, physical demand, performance, effort and frustration of using a system. After 
memorization, participants conducted an arithmetic distraction exercise (Bateman 2007a) for 5 minutes 
(Juang et al., 2012). At this stage participants were handed a mobile device (Samsung Galaxy S4) with 
the game described in Section 3 and configured with the answers to the security questions that 
participants selected in Session 1. We first went through a test game together with the participants (to 
show them how to play the game) and then we told them to play the game on their own.   
The game started by picking a random standard challenge from a pool of 7 standard challenges (all 
participants experienced the same standard challenges but in a random order). After completing a 
standard challenge, the game player was given/deducted points. Afterwards, the challenge was removed 
from the pool of available challenges. At this stage the player was presented with a randomly selected 
recognition security questions challenge (based on the security answers that they selected prior to 
playing the game). The player continued to be presented with alternate standard and recognition 
challenges until they completed the 3 recognition security questions challenges. After that, the player 
was prompted with alternate standard and recall challenges until all 3 recall security questions 
challenges were completed. This is where the game ended. In total, each player completed 7 standard 
challenges, 3 recognition and 3 recall security questions challenges. 
After playing the game, the participants completed the NASA/TLX to measure the workload of playing 
the game.  After completing another 5 minutes distraction task (Bateman 2007b) participants were 
asked to write down the answers to their security questions to understand the short-term effect of using 
the game to remember the answers for both groups (RQ1).  
4.2 Participants 
We recruited 20 participants (5 females, 15 males) through word of mouth and personal connections. 
The mean age was 29 (22-45), med=28. 16 participants were post-graduate students and the rest (4) 
were employed full-time. Only 2/20 participants reported that they were not experienced and confident 
with using security questions on online websites. All participants (20/20) self-reported that they owned 
a smartphone for more than three years.  
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5 Results  
In this section we present how the results of the user evaluation described in Section 4 answer our 
research questions (RQ1 and RQ2). Since we used independent samples, we tested for statistical 
differences between our groups (Group 1 and Group 2) using T-Test (for independent samples) when 
data was normalized and Mann-Whitney U test when data was not normalized (< 0.05 using Shapiro-
Wilk normality test). We assume that statistically significant differences are achieved when p < 0.05. 
5.1 Does the game have the potential to help users remember answers to 
security questions? 
After playing the game we asked all participants to write down the answers to the security questions that 
they selected in Session 1. We wanted to understand whether participants remember them (short-term) 
after conducting two arithmetic distraction tasks and playing a game in between. All participants 
(20/20) remembered the answers. All participants (10/10) that used their own answers to security 
questions (Group 1) reported that their answers were based on their own life experiences. Hence, 
although it was highly likely that these participants would remember (short-term) the answers to the 
security questions that are based on their own life experiences, it is still interesting to notice that no-one 
used fake answers. With regards to Group 2, it is interesting to note that 4/10 participants that answered 
security questions based on a system-generated profile failed to solve recall security questions game 
challenges. However, despite the game did not provide them with the correct answer (due to security 
reasons), they still provided the correct answer when they were asked to write down their answer. These 
findings indicate that the proposed serious game has the potentially of helping users which use stronger 
answers to security questions to remember their answers, even in the long-term. 
5.2 What’s the impact of system-generated profiles on memorizing answers, 
playing a game and remembering answers to security questions? (RQ2) 
To understand the impact of using system-generated data for answers to security questions we measured 
the workload of memorizing answers, playing the game and remembering answers. Workload was 
collected using the standard NASA/TLX questionnaire (Hart & Staveland 1988), which measures mental 
demand, physical demand, temporal demand, effort, performance, and frustration on a scale of 0 to 100.  
 
Figure 3: Workload for a) Task 1 - Memorizing Answers, b) Task 2- Playing Game and c) Task 3 - 
Remembering Answers for Groups 1 and 2. Significant differences are shown in green dashed boxes. 
As shown in Figure 3a, participants evaluated the workload of memorizing answers to security questions 
(Task 1), which were based on their own security answers (Group 1) to be low in all measures. This result 
is related to the fact that all participants reported that they use answers based on their own life 
experiences to answer these questions. Although, for all measures participants that based their answers 
on a system-generated profile (Group 2) reported higher workload (see Figure 3a), only mental demand 
(t(18)=-3.594, p=0.002), effort (t(18)=-2.939, p=0.009) and frustration (t(18)=-2.726, p=0.014) were 
significantly higher than the results obtained for Group 1. This means that memorizing system-
generated answers for security questions was considered to have a medium workload (closer to low) for 
mental demand, effort and frustration while the other measures were considered to be low and similar 
to using their own answers to security questions.  
Mental demand after the game play activity (Task 2) was evaluated to be significantly higher by 
participants that used a system-generated profile to answer security questions (t(18)=-2.685, p=0.015). 
All the other measures of the game activity were evaluated similarly by both groups (no significant 
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differences (see Figure 3b)). Except for physical demand and frustration which were evaluated to be 
low, the other measures (mental demand, temporal demand, performance and effort) were evaluated 
to have medium workload. This result might be related to the challenging aspect of the game, since on 
average participants failed to solve 2 standard challenges out of 7. 
The task of remembering answers to security questions (Task 3) was evaluated to be low for all measures 
for both groups (see Figure 3c). However, participants that had to remember answers to security 
questions based on a system-generated profile (Group 2) found the mental demand (U=18, p=0.014), 
performance (U=24.5, p=0.048) and effort (U=14, p=0.006) to require significantly more workload 
than participants that remembered their own answers (Group 1). There were no significant differences 
between the groups for the other measures (physical demand, temporal demand and frustration). 
These findings imply that despite requiring more effort and mental demand, participants in Group 2 
still required a low workload to remember answers to security questions using a system-generated 
profile and in the short-term there was not much difference compared to the other group.   
We did not find any significant differences in game performance (similar amounts of solved challenges, 
used hints and time taken to play the game). These findings suggest that playing the game using 
challenges of system-generated answers to security questions did not require much extra effort because 
the workload and game performance were mostly similar to using answers to security questions based 
on participants own lives. Also, although using system-generated data significantly impacted the 
workload of memorizing and remembering answers, the workload was still evaluated to be medium for 
memorizing answers (which is a one-time task) and low for remembering answers. 
6 Discussion 
In this section, we discuss how our results could help bridge the trade-off between security and usability 
(in terms of memorability (Just and Aspinall 2009)) for security questions.  
6.1 Improving memorability through serious games 
Previous work has implemented novel graphical authentication schemes (Denning et al. 2011; Stobert 
and Biddle 2013; Castellucia et al. 2017) or used mnemonics (Juang et al. 2012) and games to improve 
the memorability of passwords (Tao and Adams 2008; Malempati and Mogalla 2011; McLennan et al. 
2017). Since the system-generated data that we used in our studies (see Figure 2) is completely different 
from the passwords/schemes used by previous work, we cannot conduct any direct memorability 
comparisons. However, since the proposed serious game seems to have helped participants who were 
using system-generated profiles to remember their answers, even when they failed to solve some of the 
recall challenges presented by the game, we argue that from a high-level perspective our memorability 
results seem to confirm the effectiveness of using serious games to improve memorability of answers to 
security questions. More specifically, our findings seem to indicate that the proposed serious game could 
potentially lead to improve the long-term memorability of answers to security questions (this still has to 
be evaluated in a longitudinal field study). This improvement in memorability would directly improve 
the usability of stronger answers to security questions (Just and Aspinall 2009).  Hence, this potential 
improvement in memorability of answers to security questions shows that the proposed serious game 
(which was designed using memorability concepts (Atkinson and Shiffrin 1968)) could eventually help 
reduce the trade-off between usability and security in fall-back authentication. 
6.2 Impact of using system-generated profiles 
When comparing the workload results to other work, we found that the workload (e.g. mental demand, 
temporal demand, physical demand, effort, etc.) of memorizing answers to security questions based on 
system-generated profiles is slightly higher than when using user-generated free-form gestures 
(gestures that allow all fingers to draw a path on an empty screen with requiring a grid) for 
authentication (Sherman et al. 2014). Remembering system-generated answers is comparable to using 
free-form gestures. When comparing our workload results to a study which assessed password reset 
policies at a university (Parkin et al. 2015), we found that using system-generated answers requires less 
workload than registering for a password recovery policy and when authenticating to recover passwords. 
Hence, our work also reveals that using system-generated profiles to answer security questions did not 
have any significant short-term effect on any major aspects of our evaluation or compared to other work 
in the area. Therefore, we argue that the use of system-generated data to answers security questions 
could play an important role in reducing the vulnerabilities (to social engineering attacks) of our online 
accounts (Shay et al. 2012) without requiring much extra effort (in the-short term), when compared to 
using our own answers to security questions.  
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7 Limitations and Future Work 
One of the main limitations of our evaluation is that we only evaluated the short-term memorability of 
the game to nudge users’ memorability of stronger answers to security questions. Hence, future studies 
need to confirm whether or not our findings could be extended to long-term memorability. Another 
limitation is that we primarily focused on the 18-35 age group, since in Australia this is the demographic 
that uses mobile phones the most (95%) (Poushter 2016). Although, other research (McLennan et al. 
2017) found that serious games in security education are considered to be fun by different populations, 
we still plan to investigate different age groups to determine whether our findings also extend to 
different populations. We will also conduct a security evaluation of the proposed serious game to 
determine the security vulnerabilities that need to be addressed to achieve the required security level. 
Afterwards, we will conduct a longitudinal field study to determine how much training is required, so 
that users learn the answers to their security questions, when using the proposed serious game.   
8 Conclusions 
The main outcome of this research is that our participants remembered (short-term) their answers to 
security questions (RQ1) after the game play activity (including participants that used system-generated 
profiles, see Figure 2). Our work also revealed that using system-generated profiles to answer security 
questions did not have any significant short-term effect on playing the game and remembering answers 
to security questions, compared to users that used their own answers (RQ2). Thus, the main 
contribution of our work is that our findings indicate that the proposed serious game could potentially 
lead to improve the users’ long-term memorability of stronger answers to security questions. This 
improvement in memorability would directly improve the usability of using strong answers to security 
questions (Just and Aspinall 2009).  Hence, we strongly believe that the potential improvement in 
memorability achieved through the use of a serious game (which uses memorability concepts) could 
eventually help reduce the trade-off between usability and security in fall-back authentication.  
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